

**SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/10/07 : CIA-RDP80B01676R004200170010-9

ER 10-5320

15 JUL 1958

NSC REVIEW  
COMPLETED,  
6/26/03

*and*  
Gordon Gray, Esquire  
The White House  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Gordon:

World and Asian attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons in general and local wars have been discussed in a number of National Intelligence Estimates over the past few years. In particular, I would call your attention to NIE 100-4-57: "Implications of Growing Nuclear Capabilities for the Communist Bloc and the Free World," 9 July 1957, and SNIE 100-7-58: "Sino-Soviet and Free World Reactions to U. S. use of Nuclear Weapons in Limited Wars in the Far East", which is now in process in response to NSC Action 1934 d and due for final approval and publications on 22 July 1958.

I might comment that it is extremely difficult to make accurate generalization concerning "Asian" reactions to the use of nuclear weapons. Such reactions would vary considerably from country to country, between various groups within any given country, and with the particular circumstances of the case.

In general I believe it impossible to say that the peoples and leaders of Asia are any more or any less concerned about the use of the nuclear weapons in general war than are the peoples and leaders in other regions of the free world. Few would wish to see the Bloc triumph in any military engagement and many would support Western use of nuclear weapons if necessary to prevent such a triumph.

( )

*White House*

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One problem for the U. S. involves the meeting of local aggression in the Far East. It is here that we believe U. S. use of nuclear weapons would stimulate a strong reaction among most Asians, save for the leaders of the ROK, the Republic of China, Vietnam, and possibly the Philippines. Unless the Communist attack were a large-scale, blatant effort at expansion, the U. S. would be condemned for "again" using nuclear weapons against "Asians" (the racial issue) and of increasing the dangers of general war.

If the National Estimates referred to above are not available to you, I should be glad to send you copies.

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Allen W. Dulles  
Director

(ODDI:JCG:jts, 9 July 1958)

Last page rewritten by AWD 14 July 1958

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Concur: DD/I concurred in original (att)  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

10 July 1958

Date

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The real problem for the U. S. involves local aggression in the Far East. It is here that we believe U. S. use of nuclear weapons would stimulate a strong reaction among all Asians, save for the leaders of the ROC, the Republic of China, Vietnam, and possibly the Philippines. Unless the Communist attack were a large-scale, blatant effort at expansion, the U. S. would be condemned for "again" using weapons against "Asians" (the racial issue) and of unnecessarily increasing the dangers of general war.


Allen W. Dulles  
Director

(ODDI:JCG:jts, 9 July 58)

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Concur:

  
Deputy Director (Intelligence)

**JUL 10 1958**

Date

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*Qma*  
~~The real~~ problem for the U. S. involves local aggression in the Far East. It is here that we believe U. S. use of nuclear weapons would stimulate a strong reaction among ~~all~~ Asians, save for the leaders of the ROK, the Republic of China, Vietnam, and possibly the Philippines. Unless the Communist attack were a large-scale, blatant effort at expansion, the U. S. would be condemned for "again" using weapons against "Asians" (the racial issue) and of ~~unnecessarily~~ increasing the dangers of general war.

Allen W. Dulles  
Director

*nuclear*  
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EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF DEFENSE MOBILIZATION

WASHINGTON

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

June 27, 1958

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
Dear Allen:

You will recall that in Admiral Stump's speech at Quantico he said that from his experience the great fear among Asians was not that we would use nuclear weapons in a conflict but that we would not. I have heard others who have been stationed or who have travelled in Asia say the same thing. On the other hand, as you well know, there is constantly voiced concern here in Washington that we would lose our Asian friends if they were told that we were planning to use nuclear weapons.

I find myself without a basis for a view in which I would have confidence.

Have you ever made a study of this matter, and if so could you identify it for me?

Sincerely,



Gordon Gray  
Director

Honorable Allen W. Dulles

Director of Central Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Dulles

After you have noted, I will send this on to DD/I for comment and preparation of an appropriate reply for your signature.



30 June 58  
(DATE)

FORM NO. 101 REPLACES FORM 10-101  
1 AUG 54 WHICH MAY BE USED.

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